The French are revolting. The Greeks, too. And it’s about time.
Both countries held elections Sunday that were in effect referendums on
the current European economic strategy, and in both countries voters
turned two thumbs down. It’s far from clear how soon the votes will lead
to changes in actual policy, but time is clearly running out for the
strategy of recovery through austerity — and that’s a good thing.
Needless to say, that’s not what you heard from the usual suspects in
the run-up to the elections. It was actually kind of funny to see the
apostles of orthodoxy trying to portray the cautious, mild-mannered
François Hollande
as a figure of menace. He is “rather dangerous,” declared The
Economist, which observed that he “genuinely believes in the need to
create a fairer society.” Quelle horreur!
What is true is that Mr. Hollande’s victory means the end of “Merkozy,”
the Franco-German axis that has enforced the austerity regime of the
past two years. This would be a “dangerous” development if that strategy
were working, or even had a reasonable chance of working. But it isn’t
and doesn’t; it’s time to move on. Europe’s voters, it turns out, are
wiser than the Continent’s best and brightest.
What’s wrong with the prescription of spending cuts as the remedy for
Europe’s ills? One answer is that the confidence fairy doesn’t exist —
that is, claims that slashing government spending would somehow
encourage consumers and businesses to spend more have been
overwhelmingly refuted by the experience of the past two years. So
spending cuts in a depressed economy just make the depression deeper.
Moreover, there seems to be little if any gain in return for the pain.
Consider the case of Ireland, which has been a good soldier in this
crisis, imposing ever-harsher austerity in an attempt to win back the
favor of the bond markets. According to the prevailing orthodoxy, this
should work. In fact, the will to believe is so strong that members of
Europe’s policy elite keep proclaiming that Irish austerity has indeed
worked, that the Irish economy has begun to recover.
But it hasn’t. And although you’d never know it from much of the press
coverage, Irish borrowing costs remain much higher than those of Spain
or Italy, let alone
Germany. So what are the alternatives?
One answer — an answer that makes more sense than almost anyone in Europe is willing to admit — would be to break up
the euro, Europe’s common currency. Europe wouldn’t be in this fix if
Greece
still had its drachma, Spain its peseta, Ireland its punt, and so on,
because Greece and Spain would have what they now lack: a quick way to
restore cost-competitiveness and boost exports, namely devaluation.
As a counterpoint to Ireland’s sad story, consider the case of Iceland,
which was ground zero for the financial crisis but was able to respond
by devaluing its currency, the krona (and also had the courage to let
its banks fail and default on their debts). Sure enough, Iceland is
experiencing the recovery Ireland was supposed to have, but hasn’t.
Yet breaking up the euro would be highly disruptive, and would also
represent a huge defeat for the “European project,” the long-run effort
to promote peace and democracy through closer integration. Is there
another way? Yes, there is — and the Germans have shown how that way can
work. Unfortunately, they don’t understand the lessons of their own
experience.
Talk to German opinion leaders about the euro crisis, and they like to
point out that their own economy was in the doldrums in the early years
of the last decade but managed to recover. What they don’t like to
acknowledge is that this recovery was driven by the emergence of a huge
German trade surplus vis-à-vis other European countries — in particular,
vis-à-vis the nations now in crisis — which were booming, and
experiencing above-normal inflation, thanks to low interest rates.
Europe’s crisis countries might be able to emulate Germany’s success if
they faced a comparably favorable environment — that is, if this time it
was the rest of Europe, especially Germany, that was experiencing a bit
of an inflationary boom.
So Germany’s experience isn’t, as the Germans imagine, an argument for
unilateral austerity in Southern Europe; it’s an argument for much more
expansionary policies elsewhere, and in particular for the European
Central Bank to drop its obsession with inflation and focus on growth.
The Germans, needless to say, don’t like this conclusion, nor does the
leadership of the central bank. They will cling to their fantasies of
prosperity through pain, and will insist that continuing with their
failed strategy is the only responsible thing to do. But it seems that
they will no longer have unquestioning support from the Élysée Palace.
And that, believe it or not, means that both the euro and the European
project now have a better chance of surviving than they did a few days
ago.